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Relational reasoning ability relies upon by both cognitive and social factors. We compared
analogical reasoning performance in healthy controls (HC) to performance in individuals
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), and individuals with schizophrenia (SZ). The
experimental task required participants to find correspondences between drawings of
scenes. Participants were asked to infer which item within one scene best matched
a relational item within the second scene. We varied relational complexity, presence
of distraction, and type of objects in the analogies (living or non-living items). We
hypothesized that the cognitive differences present in SZ would reduce relational
inferences relative to ASD and HC. We also hypothesized that both SZ and ASD would
show lower performance on living item problems relative to HC due to lower social function
scores. Overall accuracy was higher for HC relative to SZ, consistent with prior research.
Across groups, higher relational complexity reduced analogical responding, as did the
presence of non-living items. Separate group analyses revealed that the ASD group was
less accurate at making relational inferences in problems that involved mainly non-living
items and when distractors were present. The SZ group showed differences in problem
type similar to the ASD group. Additionally, we found significant correlations between
social cognitive ability and analogical reasoning, particularly for the SZ group. These results
indicate that differences in cognitive and social abilities impact the ability to infer analogical
correspondences along with numbers of relational elements and types of objects present
in the problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Reasoning ability is a fundamental aspect of cognition. Humans
are capable of drawing together diverse information in order
to generate new inferences and discoveries (Penn et al., 2008;
Krawczyk, 2012). An important skill driving reasoning and infer-
ence is the ability to consider the relations among objects,
rather than the perceptual and sensory aspects of the objects
themselves (Gentner, 1983; Hummel and Holyoak, 1997, 2003).
Relational reasoning ability develops with age and increases as
relational knowledge is acquired in childhood (Gentner and
Toupin, 1986; Goswami and Brown, 1989; Goswami, 2001) and
remains robust throughout the adult lifespan (Goswami and
Brown, 1989; Viskontas et al., 2004). Developmental studies of
analogical reasoning have shown consistent increases in relational
matching with objects (Halford et al., 1994), words (Gentner and
Rattermann, 1991), and visual scenes (Markman and Gentner,
1993; Richland et al., 2006) as children age. Cognitive disorders
reduce relational reasoning abilities. In the current study, we
evaluated three aspects of scene analogical reasoning in healthy
individuals and in individuals with either Autism Spectrum
Disorder (ASD) or schizophrenia (SZ), both groups exhibiting
cognitive and social impairments. Such comparisons may jointly
illuminate important processes in analogical reasoning and clarify
how reasoning is affected by social cognitive disorders.
Analogical reasoning involves several cognitive processes
including perception, semantic memory, and working memory
(see Krawczyk, 2012 for review). Prior studies of scene anal-
ogy indicate that working memory and executive functions are
particularly important. Relational matching in scene analogy
tasks is reduced by concurrent working memory load (Waltz
et al., 2000), as well as under stressful and anxiety provoking
conditions that reduce working memory (Tohill and Holyoak,
2000; Vendetti et al., 2012). Further, in developmental studies
relational matching has been shown to emerge around age six
and continuing to develop with age and increases in semantic
knowledge and working memory (Gentner and Toupin, 1986;
Goswami and Brown, 1989; Goswami, 2001). One of the reasons
working memory is important in analogical reasoning is that
sometimes analogs have multiple relations. For example a cat
can be chasing a mouse, while also being chased by a dog. In
a similar situation, a girl may be chasing her pet, while her
brother chases her. Keeping in mind which individuals occupy
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 517 | 1
Krawczyk et al. Investigation of reasoning by analogy
agent and patient roles in these two scenarios can tax working
memory load. Such problems are often more difficult to solve
and require greater processing time (Cho et al., 2007; Krawczyk
et al., 2010). Cho et al. (2007) reported that requiring mainte-
nance of information relevant to solving analogies over longer
durations similarly decreases reasoning performance. Working
memory interfaces with semantic memory in relational reasoning,
as categorizing incoming information and noticing relationships
among objects and the rules by which they interact are both
critically important (Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996; Krawczyk et al.,
2005). Scene analogy performance is a useful measure of cogni-
tion in disorders, because of this emphasis on working memory
and semantic memory. Such tasks may have greater ecological
validity than more traditional neuropsychological measures that
focus on one construct alone. In the current study we combined a
scene analogy task with neuropsychological measures of cognitive
and social function in order to elucidate the relationships between
these abilities in ASD and SZ.
Prior patient studies of relational reasoning have focused
on the role of executive function abilities, including work-
ing memory. Individuals with Frontotemporal Lobar Degen-
eration (FTLD) with an onset within the prefrontal cortex
show reduced levels of relational responding on scene analo-
gies (Morrison et al., 2004) and four-term analogies (Krawczyk
et al., 2008) along with other forms of relational reasoning
(Waltz et al., 1999; Goel et al., 2009). Traumatic Brain Injuries
(TBI) can also lead to impairments in executive functioning
(see Levin and Hanten, 2005 for a review). Krawczyk et al.
(2010) reported that adolescents TBI also show reductions in
scene analogy performance. Frontal executive disruption often
leads to a greater tendency to select non-relational distractor
items that match on the basis of perceptual similarity only
(Morrison et al., 2004; Krawczyk et al., 2008, 2010). Such matches
are also characteristic of younger children who have not yet
fully exhibited a shift toward relational responding (Goswami
and Brown, 1989; Goswami, 2001). Executive functions impor-
tant for relational reasoning appear to be both managing rela-
tional complexity in working memory (Halford et al., 1994)
and maintaining inhibitory control over the task so that deci-
sions are not made based on semantic or perceptual similarity
(Krawczyk et al., 2010). In addition to executive function, social
cognitive processing is likely an important target for additional
research.
Individuals with mild ASD present with social deficits, but may
not show evidence of language delays (Bowman, 1988). Reason-
ing ability in ASD exhibits a mixed profile necessitating further
investigation. Individuals with mild ASD symptoms may perform
at the level of neurotypical individuals on abstract reasoning
ability, as measured by visuo-spatial intelligence tests (Hayashi
et al., 2008) and show typical levels of understanding prag-
matics in language. Reasoning abilities may not be constrained
by verbal intelligence, especially at the mild end of the Autism
spectrum (Pijnacker et al., 2009a). Meanwhile, individuals with
ASD have deficits in reasoning about others states of mind, or
mentalizing (Blackshaw et al., 2001), as well as certain aspects
of pragmatic reasoning (Pijnacker et al., 2009a,b). Morsanyi and
Holyoak (2010) investigated analogy performance using a scene
analogical reasoning task and reported that children with ASD
(excluding cases of pervasive developmental delay) were unim-
paired on scene analogies despite social deficits. These results
suggest intact ability to handle greater relational complexity in
analogical reasoning in ASD. Sahyoun et al. (2009) compared
four-term (A:B::C:D) picture analogy performance in individ-
uals with more severe ASD, less severe ASD and neurotypical
individuals. The less-severe ASD group showed similar strong
performance to controls in visual and semantic analogical rea-
soning and the autism group showed only longer response times.
Despite these strong visuo-spatial and relational reasoning skills
in ASD, there may be variations in reasoning with socially-
relevant relational content. To date there have been no studies
of the influence of social context in relational reasoning, despite
ASD symptomatology that indicates deficits in certain areas of
inference, as well as mentalizing deficits. It is important to
note that ASD encompasses a range of symptoms with a widely
heterogeneous severity level (Lai et al., 2014). We focus in the
current manuscript on mild ASD lacking significant language
delays.
Another relevant comparison group for examining reason-
ing differences is SZ, which is associated with impairments in
several cognitive domains, including executive function, declar-
ative memory, working memory and processing speed (Heinrichs
and Zakzanis, 1998; Green et al., 2000; Dickinson et al., 2004;
Nuechterlein et al., 2004; Tamminga et al., 2010). There is a
broad literature indicating delusional thinking in SZ, which is
considered to be a major deficit of reasoning (Startup et al., 2008;
Langdon et al., 2010), but there are relatively few laboratory-based
studies of reasoning in SZ. Evidence suggests that individuals
with SZ may be impaired when performing analogy problems,
which may be clinically useful to examine. Individuals with SZ
also exhibit basic executive function deficits on tasks that involve
working memory and cognitive control (Elliott et al., 1995; Math-
eson and Langdon, 2008; Snyder et al., 2008), mental functions
that form the foundation of abstract reasoning abilities (Holyoak
and Kroger, 1995; Krawczyk, 2012). There is also abundant evi-
dence that individuals with SZ exhibit dysfunctions in mentaliz-
ing abilities (Frith and Corcoran, 1996; Doody et al., 1998; Ziv
et al., 2011), and emotion recognition (Pinkham et al., 2008)—
abilities that are important for social cognition. The rather limited
analogical reasoning evidence reported in the literature indicates
that individuals with SZ exhibit deficits in forming analogical
correspondences between stories using a task developed by Gick
and Holyoak (1983) (Simpson and Done, 2004). Thus, SZ is
likely to impair scene analogy performance due to both cognitive
control and social cognitive deficits.
In the current experiment, we tested the effects of cognitive
and social deficits on analogical reasoning across ASD, SZ, and
healthy controls (HC) using both a scene analogy task and several
social and cognitive tests in a neuropsychological battery. The
analogy experiment required inferences based on either rela-
tional correspondences, or perceptual similarities. We used a task
adapted from Richland et al. (2006) which requires participants
to compare two line drawn pictures consisting of three to four
key objects that match based on the relations (e.g., chasing, or
reaching) present in the two pictures. Relational complexity is
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varied including either one or two relations in the problems. The
need for inhibitory control is varied by the inclusion of distracting
items appearing in some of the problems. These problems include
objects that appear in both scenes, but are not the correct analogi-
cal answer. We further adapted the problem set to vary in the type
of items presented in the analogies in order to examine social rela-
tional content. Social knowledge influences reasoning in cross-
cultural studies involving differences in knowledge about social
conduct and relationships (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides,
1989; Chua et al., 2005). Social abilities also affect reasoning in
individuals with psychopathy (Link et al., 1977; Blair, 1995; Raine
and Yang, 2006; Ermer and Kiehl, 2010). In our modified problem
set half of the items contained predominantly non-living objects,
whereas the remaining half contained living objects, mainly peo-
ple or animals. In living problems, the relations were mainly
action-based, such as chasing, kissing, and throwing, whereas
non-living problems included many spatial relations, such as
spatial positions, or pouring liquid. This variation in problem
content was included to test whether the clinical populations show
evidence of reasoning differences based on type of objects shown
in the problems.
The use of a scene analogy task enabled us to test for multiple
cognitive abilities important for reasoning. We predicted high
performance in healthy control participants (Richland et al.,
2006; Krawczyk et al., 2010; Morsanyi and Holyoak, 2010), which
should enable any possible differences in performance among
the clinical groups to be observed. We hypothesized that all
participants would show performance reductions when problems
are more relationally complex and when there are distracting
items present (Markman and Gentner, 1993; Morrison et al.,
2004; Richland et al., 2006). We predicted that the individuals
with SZ would show deficits in analogical reasoning overall, with
specific deficits in problems with distractors and in relationally
complex problems due to the cognitive deficits previously asso-
ciated with SZ including executive function, declarative memory,
working memory and processing speed (Tamminga et al., 2010).
We predicted lower performance on living compared to non-
living problems in individuals with social deficits present. This
includes ASD and SZ, but not healthy controls. In the ASD
participants, we predicted that performance would be similar to
controls on relational complexity and distraction, which would
replicate the findings of Morsanyi and Holyoak (2010), who
studied scene analogy in younger participants with ASD. An
overall goal of the current research is to compare reasoning
performance across two groups collectively known to have deficits
in social cognition to determine how they are similar and how
they differ.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 43 participants were enrolled in the study. The par-
ticipant groups consisted of 15 individuals diagnosed with ASD,
13 individuals diagnosed with SZ, and 15 HC. Participants with
SZ were recruited from University of Texas Southwestern Med-
ical Center (UTSW). ASD and HC participants were recruited
from the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area. Male and female
participants between the ages of 17 to 45 with a full scale IQ
of at least 75 were enrolled. Six HC participants were recruited
from The University of Texas at Dallas and participated for
course credit. The remaining nine HC participants participated
for payment. The ASD group had a current primary diagnosis of
ASD as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 4th ed. (DSM-IV; APA, 2000) criteria (all data were
collected prior to the publication of DSM-V). Our ASD sample
exhibited social cognitive difficulties lacking significant language
delays. For SZ participants, the diagnosis of SZ or schizoaffective
disorder was supported by SCID-IV and confirmed during a
consensus meeting of experienced clinicians at a SZ clinic at
UTSW. This study included six individuals with Paranoid SZ,
five with schizoaffective disorder and two diagnosed with SZ
undifferentiated.
Participants were excluded if their clinical status (e.g., serious
suicidal or homicidal risk) required inpatient or day hospital
treatment, if they had a history of seizures, or if they reported
substance dependence within the last 3 months or use within
that last month. Participants who met all inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria were enrolled in the study. All individuals provided
written informed consent to participate in the research study.
All procedures were approved by Institutional Review boards of
the University of Texas at Dallas and the University of Texas at
Southwestern Medical Center.
The ASD group included 11 males and 4 females with ages
ranging from 17 to 34 (M = 21.73, SD = 4.39), years of education
ranged from 11 to 16 (M = 13.26 SD = 1.75). The SZ group
included seven males and six females with ages ranging from 18 to
39 (M = 30.00, SD = 5.72), years of education ranged from 11 to
16 (M = 12.92, SD = 2.25). All of the SZ were actively medicated
and underwent a battery of neuropsychological tests. The HC
group included six males and nine females with ages ranging from
18 to 45 (M = 23.44, SD = 4.00), years of education ranged from
12 to 18 (M = 14.22, SD = 2.04).
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES
There were some differences in demographic variables, executive,
and social functions among the groups (refer to Table 1). A one-
way ANOVA showed a significant effect of age F(2,36) = 10.89, p
< 0.001 with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealing that
SZ were significantly older than the ASD and HC groups. There
were significant differences in estimated full scale IQ using the
wechsler abbreviated scale of intelligence (WASI), F(2,32) = 31.87,
p < 0.001. ASD estimated full scale IQ (M = 107.5, SD = 14.07),
SZ (M = 101.67, SD = 12.84), and HC (M = 120.44, SD = 9.20).
The HC participants displayed an estimated Full Scale Intelligence
Quotient (FSIQ) above SZ and the ASD groups. FSIQ scores were
not available for 10 participants (ASD = 3, SZ = 1, HC = 6).
VOCABULARY AND NONVERBAL REASONING MEASURES
Estimated differences in intelligence were primarily due to dif-
ferences in vocabulary scores, rather than non-verbal reasoning
scores. An ANOVA comparing the groups on vocabulary scores
was significant F(2,35) = 6.57, p = 0.004. Bonferroni-corrected
post-hoc tests indicated that HC exhibited higher vocabulary
scores (M = 64.78, SD = 6.04) than SZ (M = 49.25, SD = 8.15).
We also tested the groups on matrix reasoning ability, which has
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previously been associated with analogical reasoning (Morsanyi
and Holyoak, 2010). There were no significant group differences
on this measure.
SOCIAL FUNCTION MEASURES
We measured social perception of emotional and mental states
using the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) (Mean
scores are reported in Table 1). There were group differences
F(2,34) = 9.26, p = 0.001 with HC performing higher than ASD
and SZ. A comparison of composite scores of Social Cognition
reached significance F(2,35) = 3.44, p = 0.04 with post-hoc tests
revealing HC to be higher than SZ (Table 1). We used a social
skills questionnaire (SSQ) that we developed to measure different
aspects of social cognition including habits outside of the home
and degree of social interaction. There were significant differences
on the SSQ F(2,30) = 6.42, p = 0.005. Post-hoc tests revealed that
HC performed higher than ASD. The SSQ also asks a question
estimating the number of friendships that involve at least monthly
contact. Analysis of this measure reached significance F(2,30) =
6.91, p = 0.004 with HC reporting more friendships than ASD
and SZ.
MATERIALS
We used a stimulus set of analogies developed for a prior develop-
mental study (Richland et al., 2006) with some modifications. The
analogies consisted of two pictures of scenes oriented vertically
(refer to Figure 1). Each scene consisted of five items representing
objects, people, or animals. Two or three of these items had
relational correspondences, such as chasing, pulling, etc. An arrow
pointed to a match item in the source scene (top picture) and
this item was to be matched to a similar item in the target scene
(bottom picture) in order to complete an analogy between the top
and bottom scenes. The prior task (Richland et al., 2006) had been
designed to investigate the effects of relational complexity and
feature distraction on the reasoning abilities of children. It was
controlled for knowledge of relations in regard to their youngest
age group tested (approximately 3–4 years of age), therefore the
relations and objects correspond to simple motion verbs (e.g.,
chase, fall, pull) and objects commonly encountered by children
of that age group including humans, animals, and common
household items.
We modified the task in two ways. First, in the original version
of the task, some distractor items in the target scene were visually
identical to the match item in the source scene, while other dis-
tractors appeared in a different position or orientation compared
to the match item. In our modified version all distractor items
were presented in a new position or orientation in the target scene.
Second, we tested for the effect of category of the key items in the
analogy (living/non-living), in addition to the original conditions
employed by Richland et al. (2006), feature distraction and rela-
tional complexity, on reasoning abilities. This was accomplished
by dividing the original problem set into examples in which the
key items involved in the relations were alive (humans or animals)
and example in which the relational items were non-living. We
also added four additional problems in order to achieve an equal
item numbers for counterbalancing.
The full set of 24 scene analogies was initially divided into
two categories. The living category consisted of 12 problems
in which the items relevant to the analogy were either people
or animals interacting. The non-living category was comprised
of 12 problems that included analogies in which the relevant
items were non-living objects that were either manmade such
as cars, trains, and lamps, or naturally occurring objects such
as ponds, rocks, and trees. Within each of these sets, rela-
tional complexity was factorially-varied (one-relation or two-
relation), as was the inclusion or exclusion of a distractor
item in the target slide that was similar to the match item
in the source slide. Figure 1 shows an example of each of
the problem types. We developed four separate versions of the
task. These were counterbalanced such that each of the 24
problems appeared as a one- and a two-relation problem and
appeared both with and without a distractor across the four
versions in order to control for specific item effects. Among
the 24 items there were three items representing each possible
combination.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The task was administered to participants on a laptop computer
using Eprime 1.2 software.1 All participants were given two prac-
tice problems that demonstrated the one- and two-relation prob-
lems to familiarize them to the task. The following instructions
were presented to each participant on the computer screen and
read aloud by the experimenter:
You will see two pictures presented one above the other on the
screen. Your job is to try and understand what is going on in each
of the pictures. There will be a pattern of things happening in the
top picture and your job will be to find that same pattern in the
bottom picture. You will notice that one thing in the top picture of
each set will have a black arrow pointing to it. Your job is to find
the object in the bottom picture that best matches the one in the
top picture.
1www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime
Table 1 | Participant demographics, cognitive scores, and social scores.
Participant group Age Education FSIQ Matrix reasoning Vocabulary Social cognition Mind in eyes SSQ total SSQ friends
ASP 21.73(4.39) 13.26(1.75) 107.50(14.07) 54.57(6.25) 54.73(12.45) 46.13(11.75) 20.64(4.96) 15.50(1.78) 3.10(3.81)
SZ 30.00(5.72) 12.92(2.25) 101.67(12.84) 53.50(8.03) 48.08(10.18) 44.33(10.08) 23.67(4.05) 16.91(2.81) 3.50(5.68)
HC 23.44(4.00) 14.22(2.04) 120.44(9.20) 57.89(5.04) 64.78(6.04) 56.33(10.54) 28.33(2.73) 19.78(3.15) 11.67(7.23)
Note. Age and education reported in years; FSIQ = Full Scale Intelligence Quotient reported as a standard score, Matrix Reasoning and Vocab = Vocabulary reported
as t-scores; Social Cognition = MSCEIT score of Managing Emotions reported as t-scores; Mind in the Eyes and SSQ = Social Skills Questionnaire are reported as
raw scores.
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FIGURE 1 | The examples of task problem types. The 24 problems
included three factors that were varied factorially: number of relations
(one-relation or two-relations), presence of distractor item (with or without
distractor), and item type involved in the analogy (living or non-living items).
Panel A shows an analogy with a single relation (reaching), involves living
objects (people and a dog), and contains no distraction. Panel B consists of
two relations (containing, and being contained), involves non-living objects
(food, bowl, cabinet, groceries, bag, and car) with no distraction. Panel C is a
one relation problem (containing) with non-living objects (water, pitcher, and
bucket), with a distractor present (the pitcher in the lower picture). Panel D
consists of two relations (receiving a message and relaying a message), living
objects (people), and has a distractor (the woman in the lower picture).
Participants indicated their response by pointing to an object
in the target picture presented on the computer screen. If the
participant answered the sample problem correctly, the researcher
would give feedback and then move on to the next sample. If
the participant responded incorrectly, the researcher would repeat
the description of the relationship shown in the source scene.
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The experimenter would then ask again which object in the target
scene followed the same pattern. The participant was guided until
the correct answer was reached with a correct description of
the pattern. At this point, the researcher would move on to the
next practice problem. If the participant was able to accurately
answer the scene analogy, the researcher began the task. If the
participant did not adequately perform the second example, the
researcher would reiterate the instructions before moving on to
the experimental task. We did not collect response time data in
this experiment, as we wanted to maximize participant accu-
racy, comprehension of the pictures, and clarity of the item the
participants chose. We had concerns that emphasizing response
time would negatively influence accuracy due to the possibility
of patients emphasizing speed over accuracy if this were a timed
task. It is also difficult to gather accurate response times when
administering the task with a finger point response.
STATISTICS
Analogical reasoning data were analyzed initially with a 3 (group)
× 2 (complexity) × 2 (distraction) × 2 (problem type) ANOVA.
This was followed up with Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests
to further investigate significant main effects. To test for group
differences within significant interactions we performed post-hoc
tests with a fixed significance level of p < 0.01. Additionally, we
ran independent 2 (distraction) × 2 (problem type) × 2 (com-
plexity) ANOVAs on the data from each group independently to
further clarify the performance observed in each of the groups.
Lastly, we conducted a Pearson’s bivariate correlational analysis in
order to evaluate the relationship between the analogy accuracy
and each measure of social cognition.
RESULTS
COMBINED GROUP ANALYSIS
Results of the 3 (group)× 2 (distraction)× 2 (problem type)× 2
(complexity) ANOVA revealed three main effects on task accuracy
as summarized below.
Participant group
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of group, F(1,40) = 5.51, p =
0.008. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests indicated that the HC
participants performed the task at higher accuracy levels (M =
94.40%) than SZ participants (M = 84.60%) (refer to Figure 2).
No other group comparisons reached significance.
Relational complexity level
The number of relations had a significant effect on performance,
with two-relation analogies (M = 86.82%) resulting in lower
mean performance than one-relation analogies (M = 92.44%),
F(1,40) = 8.71, p = 0.005 (refer to Figure 2).
Problem type: living vs. non-living
There was a significant main effect of problem type such
that problems involving living items were solved at a higher
level (M = 93.22%) than those involving non-living items
(M = 86.05%), F(1,47) = 17.46, p< 0.001 (refer to Figure 2).
Presence of distractor
There was no significant effect of distractor items on overall
performance (p> 0.05).
SEPARATE GROUP ANALYSES
ASD participants
The ASD group showed main effects of relation, in which one-
relation problems were solved at a higher level than two-relation
problems F(1,14) = 6.18, p < 0.05. The ASD participants also
showed a Problem Type main effect, in which living problems
were solved at a higher level than non-living problems F(1,14) =
4.68, p < 0.05. There was also a Relation level by Problem Type
interaction F(1,14) = 6.67, p < 0.05, such that two-relation living
problems were solved at a higher rate than two-relation non-living
problems (Figure 2A).
SZ participants
There was a main effect of Problem Type, such that living
problems were solved more accurately than non-living problems
F(1,12) = 7.89, p < 0.01, as evident in Figure 2B, and a marginally
significant effect of relation (one-relation more accurate than
two-relation problems) F(1,12) = 4.14, p = 0.065.
HC participants
There were no significant main effects for HC participants reflect-
ing the overall high performance of the group. Performance was
uniformly high among HC participants for each type of problem.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSES
The lack of an effect of distraction in the performance of all
three groups was somewhat surprising. In order to further explore
whether there was any tendency for the groups to miss problems
when a distracting item was present, we calculated a Distraction
Score, which was the proportion of errors made on problems
with a distractor present in which participants selected the dis-
tractor item relative to errors in which participants selected any
item other than the distractor (or correct relational answer). We
first tested for Distractor Score proportion differences within
each group comparing between Problem Type, which had been
the major factor leading to errors, by using dependent-samples
t-tests. All groups showed a tendency toward selecting more
distractor items in problems with living items relative to prob-
lems with non-living items. This difference was significant for
SZ participants t(12) = 3.04, p < 0.01, and for HC participants
t(14) = 2.26, p < 0.05. Thus, non-living problems tended to elicit
greater levels of distractor selection in most of the participant
groups.
CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS
We conducted a series of bivariate Pearson correlational analy-
ses to assess the possible relationship between social cognitive
measures and analogical reasoning performance. Overall accu-
racy on analogical reasoning was compared to our composite
measure of social cognition, the Mind in the Eyes score, SSQ
score, and reported number of friendships. There were significant
correlations between the social cognition composite scores and
analogical reasoning accuracy for all subjects combined (Pearson’s
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FIGURE 2 | Overall percent accuracy for each of the participant groups.
HC participants showed greater overall performance than SZ participants.
There was also a main effect of problem type and a main effect of relational
complexity. (A) ASD individuals showed a reduction in performance when
solving two-relation, non-living problems. (B) SZ showed reductions in
performance for non-living problems and a marginal reduction in performance
on two-relation problems. (C) HC participants showed high performance
across all problems types.
r = 0.36, n = 36, p = 0.031). We also observed a significant
correlation between the Mind in the Eyes test and analogical
reasoning accuracy (Pearson’s r = 0.50, n = 35, p = 0.002).
These significant correlations suggest that analogical reasoning
ability is related to social cognition, particularly regarding the
ability to assess emotional and social motivations from eye gaze.
We also tested these same correlations on each group inde-
pendently. We found a highly significant correlation between
analogical reasoning and Mind in the Eyes for the SZ group
(Pearson’s r = 0.78, n = 12, p = 0.003). There were no sig-
nificant correlations found between analogical reasoning and
any of the social cognition measures for the HC and ASD
groups.
DISCUSSION
Analogies become more difficult to solve when they include
multiple relations among objects, including multiple relational
roles played by individual objects or individuals. When per-
ceptually similar items appear in two scenes, they tend to dis-
tract from the relational problem solving performance compared
to problems that include analogous situations, which do not
include perceptually or semantically similar items. These char-
acteristics have received support from previous findings indi-
cating that analogical correspondences are often ignored when
other more basic types of similarity are present, such as per-
ceptual or semantic similarity (Markman and Gentner, 1993;
Wharton et al., 1994, 1996). Analogies also tend to be easier
to form when relations are among living or animate entities,
relative to situations that are relationally similar but include
non-living items. In the present study HC participants per-
formed the task with high accuracy, but when they did make
errors, they tended to be on problems with greater complex-
ity and when distractor items were present. HC participants
performed the analogy task at significantly higher levels than
SZ participants. ASD participants also performed the task at
relatively high levels. While there was a significantly higher IQ
estimate for the HC participants over the other two groups, this
did not appear to be the primary reason for the differences,
as ASD also showed a significantly lower estimated IQ than
HC, yet showed no significant decline in analogical reasoning
performance.
ANALOGICAL REASONING IN INDIVIDUALS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA
The SZ participants showed reductions in overall performance
relative to the HC group consistent with a prior study examining
analogical reminding in SZ (Simpson and Done, 2004). The
SZ group was reliably less accurate than HC on both types of
problems. These results suggest a more general deficit in problem
solving related to the cognitive impairments exhibited by the SZ
group. The SZ group showed a trend toward reduced performance
on two-relation problems, which is similar to the performance of
younger age individuals (Richland et al., 2006). The SZ group also
showed a clear tendency to perform better on the living problems
relative to the problems that included relations among mostly
non-living objects. This was a main effect across all groups, but
SZ also showed this effect in the individual analysis.
The lower performance of SZ may be due to both executive
and social factors. In general, the SZ performance was lower in
the predicted ways based on the presence of multiple relations and
distraction. Deficits in overall comprehension of the problems
or deriving unique interpretations would be sufficient to lead
SZ toward more distractor choices, or more errors in general as
shown by their overall performance relative to HC. It is important
to note that SZ individuals were not dramatically impaired on
scene analogies given their overall mean accuracy. This group
was taking medications and were not actively delusional, thus
reasoning performance was relatively intact compared to previous
reports on analogy performance that investigated delusional and
non-delusional SZ participants on an analogical memory task
(Simpson and Done, 2004). Also worth noting is that our SZ
participants showed strong performance on the Matrix Reasoning
task, which also relies heavily on relational reasoning ability,
but lacks the semantic comprehension needed for solving scene
analogies. The fact that our SZ participants were not impaired on
the Matrix Reasoning problems suggests that they were relatively
robust in executive function ability relative to other SZ patients.
This suggests the possibility that greater social cognitive deficits
influenced performance, as there was a strong correlation between
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understanding intentions and mentalizing, as measured by the
Mind in the Eyes test, and analogical reasoning accuracy in SZ.
ANALOGICAL REASONING IN INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM
DISORDER
Individuals with ASD generally performed at a high level on the
analogical reasoning task. This is consistent with the prior report
of intact scene analogy in individuals with autism (Morsanyi and
Holyoak, 2010). In that study, individuals with autism performed
similarly to HC on both scene analogies and Raven’s Matrices
problems. Similarly, our ASD participants exhibited high perfor-
mance on our modified scene analogies task and on the Matrix
Reasoning test.
One notable performance difference observed in the ASD
group was that these participants tended to show more pro-
nounced difficulties on problems that involved non-living objects
compared to HC, though non-significantly (refer to Figure 2).
This runs counter to our prediction that ASD would show a
selective deficit on problems that involved living objects, as these
individuals showed evidence of deficits in both social perception
and social interactions based on the neuropsychological testing.
As living problems tended to depict social interactions, we had
predicted that this could lead to deficits in these problems, but
this was not the case. There was an overall tendency across all
groups to perform worse on the non-living problems and this is
likely due to the nature of the relations among non-living items.
While living objects can be depicted in action sequences, such
as chasing, purposeful reaching, and calling (see Figure 1), non-
living items tended to involve relations based on spatial positions
or flowing of liquids. These types of relations may be less obvious
and therefore lead to lower performance. Though there was not a
significant interaction between problem type and distraction, it is
also possible that object matches appeared more compelling when
all or most items in the scenes were non-living.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING AND REASONING
Whereas all groups performed similarly on Matrix Reasoning,
there were differences in vocabulary that differentiated the SZ
group from the HC group. Evidence for the role of executive
function in reasoning comes from multiple sources. Two prior
scene analogy experiments conducted with non-impaired popu-
lations indicated that reductions in performance followed from
disruptions of working memory (through concurrent dual-tasks
involving executive control) (Waltz et al., 2000), and reduction
in executive control through higher anxiety (Tohill and Holyoak,
2000). Additionally, frontal lobe deficits have been shown to
reduce scene analogy performance (Morrison et al., 2004), as
well as tendencies toward distraction in relational reasoning
(Krawczyk et al., 2008). The SZ group also exhibited a profile con-
sistent with working memory reductions; however, the SZ group
was not reliably impaired on problems that included distractor
items. There is ample evidence to suggest that impairments in
reasoning follow from executive function deficiencies and frontal
lobe injuries, in the present study we have extended these findings
to the SZ population, though our particular SZ participants
were relatively intact on Matrix Reasoning problems, a relational
reasoning task lacking significant semantic comprehension.
The lack of a strong linkage between Matrix Reasoning abilities
and analogical reasoning in the current study has implications for
theoretical perspectives on analogy. Gentner (1983) has argued
that learning relational language enables reasoning by analogy
(Gentner and Toupin, 1986; Goswami and Brown, 1989). This
suggests that semantic memory and explicit language represen-
tations are important for analogical reasoning. Our results add
to this position suggesting that relations involving human agency
or interactions among living things are easier to process than
relations among non-living objects. This may be due to their
greater salience and disorders of social cognition such as SZ and
ASD did not diminish this difference in our study. There has also
been a strong link made between analogical reasoning and matrix
tasks (Morsanyi and Holyoak, 2010), with both being examples
of relational reasoning ability. In our study, we found both of
our clinical groups to be unimpaired on Matrix Reasoning (a task
lacking in semantic content), while SZ did show lower analogical
reasoning performance (a task rich in semantic content), while
ASD did not. This pattern of results points to the importance
of semantic memory and relational knowledge in reasoning, a
position advocated for in prior computational theories of analogy
(Hummel and Holyoak, 1997, 2003; Morrison et al., 2004). Future
work on social cognition and analogical reasoning could help
to further clarify the role of social information in theories of
reasoning.
SOCIAL COGNITION AND ANALOGICAL REASONING
The results of the current study provide an initial link between
social deficits and analogical reasoning performance and suggest
the need for future work. The reasoning differences present in
socially impaired groups to this point have primarily focused
on mentalizing (Frith and Corcoran, 1996) and moral prob-
lem solving (Shenhav and Greene, 2014). There have been
very few studies examining the effects of social perception
deficits on reasoning. Despite significant reductions on social
tasks including the Mind in the Eyes and SSQ for both ASD
and SZ participants, there were no strong differences on rela-
tional responding that are directly attributable to social fac-
tors, though overall performance was related to mentalizing in
SZ. Since both of our clinical groups had similar social cog-
nitive scores, we are not able to provide clear evidence dif-
ferentiating the social abilities of these two groups; however,
only in SZ was mentalizing linked to lower analogical reason-
ing. This suggests that there are differences in social cognition
between these groups, but with a relatively high functioning
and limited sample, we cannot isolate the basis for these pos-
sible differences. We support the position offered by Sasson
et al. (2011) provide a strong rationale for continuing to study
the similarities and differences present between SZ and ASD
groups.
Our results indicate that relational reasoning performance
is sensitive to content with living and non-living items being
relevant. Within our problem set, the social relations among
living agents tended to be based on actions, such as reach-
ing and throwing. These problems could likely have been
solved on the basis of action sequence comprehension in
many cases, even in individuals had difficulties perceiving
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or inferring the mental states of the participants involved
in the problems. Future work on the role of social cogni-
tion in analogies and other forms of relational problem solv-
ing will likely benefit from manipulations of intentionality
and inferences based on perceiving mental states. Without the
full capacity to perform these acts of social perception, it is
unlikely that relational reasoning can be carried out to its
maximum degree. The correlations between analogical reason-
ing and social cognition, along with mentalizing support this
possibility.
Ultimately more work must be done in this area to further
characterize reasoning abilities in SZ and ASD. While our study
is an interesting first step taking this comparative approach, we
did not have a wide sample across the Autism spectrum. It is
quite possible that younger individuals and those at more severe
levels would present with significant deficits on analogy tasks.
It is also likely that individuals with SZ may perform better on
analogical reasoning if they have higher social skills and executive
functioning abilities.
CONCLUSIONS
We examined the reasoning performance of two groups that
had impairments in executive and social functioning relative to
healthy controls. Overall differences indicate that individuals with
SZ show reductions in relational responding in analogical reason-
ing involving scene comprehension. Meanwhile, HC and individ-
uals with ASD performed at high levels on the task overall. ASD
did show an intriguing tendency to perform better on problems
that involved living objects over those with non-living objects
suggesting that they are sensitive to problem content. The clearest
explanation of the deficits present in SZ links them to disorders
of executive function and working memory, but in future work
it will be important to examine problem content more care-
fully with manipulations of emotional content and mental state
perception.
Overall, we have demonstrated that executive function deficits
appear to have the strongest impact on relational responding,
though social factors related to problem content can also have an
influence. The value of this cross-diagnosis investigation is that it
enables researchers to understand the relative competencies and
impairments of both groups compared to unimpaired individu-
als. While executive functions are relevant to basic relational rea-
soning ability, social cognitive ability may be at least as important
and future work may help to further clarify the relative similarities
and differences that occur in reasoning across psychiatric and
neurological populations.
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